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1. Introduction
The. idea that in an efficient market investorscannot profitfrom publicly available
information is taught in nearly all introductory finance courses. Despite supporting evidence,
however, several papers present empirical anomalies. For example, French (1980) and Gibbons and
Hess (1981) demonstrate that returns are significantly lower on Mondays than on other days. By
implication, investors who plan to alter their stock positions should sell on Friday and buy at the
close of Mondays trading. ICeim (1983) finds that investments in small stocks yield abnormally
positive returns during the first week in January. By implication, investors could profit if they buy
shares of small stocks just before the first of the year.
These and other documented anomalies weaken the case for the efficient market. (See also
the "Symposium on Some Anomalous Empirical Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency," 1978.) On
the other hand, none of these papers test whether investors can actually profit from these
anomalies. We add to the list of anomalies but with a twist. We document not only an apparent
profit opportunity but also the results from investing our own money.
Our investment strategy was simple. We discovered that many companies offered
stockholders the right to buy additional shares at a discount, typically of 5.263% (or 5/95) from
extant market prices. To qualify to buy this discount stock, one had only to hold at least one share of
company stock in certificate form and sign up to participate in the discount stock-purchase program.
The next step was to mail in a check for stock periodically. The company then issued, free of
commissions, discount shares that could be sold in the market within a few weeks. With an
investment of $200,000 we realized a profIt of $421,000 (consisting of $163,800 of net discount income
(the sum of all gross discounts less transaction costs), $182,600 of return on investment due to a general
increase in stock prices, and $74400 of abnormal return on investment beyond the net discount income).—2—
Thisprofit is net of brokerage fees, hedging losses, and other transactions costs. Ninety percent of
our activity occurred over less than two years.
For example, a J.P. Morganshareholder could buy up to $5,000 of J.P.Morgan stock eachmonth
at a 5263% discount. If the shareholder could immediately sell this stock at no cost, a sure profit of
$263.16 would result on each transaction. We would have preferred J.P.Morgans sending us a check
for $263.16 each month to our having to mail in the check, buy shares, and then sell them at a later
date. In fact, if we could have avoided the transaction costs incurred in undertaking these tasks, we
would have been satisfied to receive somewhat less. If investment is undertaken once a month at a
discount of 5.263%, the compound annual return exceeds 85% of the monthly investment amount.
Although it is a useful teaching device, the efficient markets hypothesis may leave students
with the false impression that innovations go unrewarded. In fact, successful innovation holds the
possibility of producing both generous financial reward for the individual and significant
improvement in social welfare. In contemplating the transaction costs and the possible impact of the
discount stock-purchase programs on stock prices, we considered it quite possible that the profit
opportunities were more apparent than real. Although our back-of-the-envelope calculations
indicated that participation in the programs would be profitable, we thought transaction costs,
other unanticipated costs, and participation by other traders might well make abnormal returns
impossible. By running our experinwnt with actual trades, we were able to provide direct evidence of
our ability to innovate arid earn abnormal returns in the market.
That we did profit handsomely suggests that the market Is not as efficient as the textbook
model suggests. Moreover, many of the programs existed for several years before we began our
experiment, and program sponsors routinely informed shareholders of record of the opportunities to
invest at a discount. Eventually, many companies eliminated the discounts on their programs as we
were joined by other arbitrageurs who helped the firm raise substantial capital. We view our—3—
profits as compensationforthe provision of investment banking services to corporations offering
discountstock-purchaseprograms, whichdelegate theunderwriting process to shareholders. In
retrospect. we were paid too muck We and others might have provided the same services for a much
tower discount. We do not know whether sponsoring corporations could have achieved the same
results at tower cost using an underwriter or whether we earned abnonnal profits because other
investors did not join us soon enough. Had mole investors participated, corporate sponsors probably
would have reduced their discounts sooner, reducing our profit and, as a mutt, reducing the costs to
other shareholders of raising capital.
Over time, many corporations realized they could raise substantial amounts with this
decentralized investment banking concept. BankAmerica, for example, reduced its discount four
times in less than two years and allowed shareholders to invest much more than $5,000 per month.
As a result, it raised over $350 million over this period at discounts well below 4%.
The use of discount stock purchase plans, and the closely related practice of allowing
shareholders to buy stock at a discount only with reinvested dividends, raises several questions. We
inquire whether these programs are equitable to nonparticipating shareholders and whether they
represent an efficient institutional device for raising capital. We only begin to shed light on the
answers to these questions. In conducting our experiment, we discovered a number of interesting
features of these arrangements.
In section 2, we describe some features of these discount plans, and in section 3, we lay out
details of the Investment strategies we used to determine the costs of securing the discounts. In
section 4, we compare discount stock-purchase plans with conventional underwritings as means of
raising capital. Concluding remarks appear in section 5.—4—
ICharacteristics of Discount Programs
Dividend-reinvestment and stock-purchase plans have been popular, especially among public
utilities,for two decades. We identified 82 companies offering such plans at some point between
1984 and 1988. Cash discount plans are concentrated in banking and financial services, although
public utilities, real estate firms, and a few manufacturers are also represented.
Industry Concentration
Table I reveals that 74 of the 82 plans we identified were concentrated in three industries:
banking (45), real estate, including real estate investment trusts (15), and public utilities (14). Of our
$3.6 million in investments, $2.6 million was invested in banks, and the rest was split relatively
equally among real estate firms, public utilities, and other firms. Banks' prominence in these
programs may reflect experimentation with an alternative institutional arrangement for raising
capital in the face of regulatory pressure. We explore other motivations in section 4.
InvestmentCeilings and Discounts
All firms discount programs limit the allowable investment. The limits prevent certain
shareholders, such as institutional and corporate investors, from fully exploiting economies of scale
in purchasing shares and reselling them in the secondary market. Moreover, nearly all plans require
that participants possess stock certificates issued in their own name rather than in the name of their
broker as agent. This requirement prevents brokerage houses from offering a service that automates
participation in the discount program on a large scale for their clients.
Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of maximum investment amounts, discount amounts,
and the period over which investment ceilings apply (quarterly, monthly, or annually) for the 66
plans for which we have data.1 In 57 of the 66 plans, the discount is 5%. Thirteen plans impose
All of these programs offered shareholders an opportunity to reinvest dividends in shares of the company
at a discount. The purchase limits tabulated in table Z however, apply only to optional cash investments. An
unlimited amount of dividends can be reinvested at a discount in these programs. This is true for all 82 of the
discount cash purchase plans we surveyed and for hundreds of other programs that do not offer discounts on—5—
monthly investment ceilings. 49 impose quarterly limits, and four plans impose annual limits.
Twenty plans permit investments of $5,000 per quarter per account at a 5% discount. The next most
common arrangements are $3,000 per quarter @ 5% (seven plans), $2,000 per quarter @5% (six plans),
and $5,000 per month @5% (six plans).
With the exception of BankAmerica (whose plan is discussed separately), the maximum
purchase permitted per account is $120,000 per year. The smallest purchase ceding is $4,000 per
year. Table 3 reports the distribution of annual purchase limits for the 57 firms offering 5%
discounts. Twenty-two (inns fall in the $20,000-$25,000 range, 14 in the $10,000-$20,000range, and 8
in the $50,000-$100,000 range.
Several plans changed their investment ceiling or discount or both over time. For these finns,
we show in the tables the terms in the earliest discount program prospectus we obtained. For
example, Chesebrough Ponds began with a monthly investment ceiling of $5,000 that it later
dropped to $1,000. CSX changed its limit from $5,000 per quarter to $1,500 per month. First Union's
maximum investment ranged from $500 to $10,000 per quarter. Bank of New England, Bankers Trust,
Icoger Companies, and Koger Properties all initially offered 5% discounts, which they later reduced
to 3%.
optional purchases of additional shares with cash. In 1975, AT&T became the first to offer this kind of program.
ISee Light (1977) for an analysis of the AT&T decision to initiate a discount dividend reinvestment plani The
plans in this latter category typically allow shareholders to purchase additional shares at 100% of fair Sarket
value but free of commissions. We did not buy shares to reinvest dividends at a discount to determine whether
this offered a profit-making opportunity, but It may be worth noting that a stock paying dividends at the annual
rate of 5% and offering the option to reinvest such dividends in additional common shares at a discount 0(5%
offers a bonuc return of only one-quarter of 1 percent of the Investment position carried per yr.
A number of dividend-reinvestment plans allow holders of securities other than common stock to purchase
common shares at a discount. Preferred shareholders are often allowed this option. Certain debtholders are
also eligible to participate in some plans. Note that a 5% discount applied to the reinvestment of interest on
12% debentures translates into a "bonus" yield of 60 basis points. It might be Interesting to study whether the
yields on such securities are lower than on those of comparable risk but where the interest is 09t eligible for
reinvestment in discounted shares,—6—
BankAmerica represents the extreme case of term changes. It began with a maximum monthly
investment of $10A0anda 5% discount. The discount has since been reduced in four steps to 2%, and
themaximummonthly investment has been increased substantially.
Calculating theActual Discount Received
Thepricepaid forsharespurchased ata discount is basedonan average ofmarket prices
observed over anywhere from I to 20 trading days. (See table 4.) The most common averaging periods
areoneday and five days.
In private conversations, corporate treasurers and investor relations administrators for some
plan sponsors said they based the sales price on an average of prices over a number of days to
minimize the effectofshort sales on share price. Many investors in discount programs apparently
lock in sure returns by selling shares short on the investment date. First Chicago, for example,
altered its pricing formula, for precisely this reason, from one based on the price solely on the
investment date to one based on a five-day avenge of high and low prices.2
Besides varying in length of the averaging period, plans vary along three other dimensions
that are relevant to calculating discounts. First, there is the question of which prices are used: last
traded, daily high and low, or closing bid and ask. More than 40% of the firms use last traded price.
A similar number use an avenge of daily highs and lows. One in six (inns use the average of closing
bid and ask prices.
Second, the avenging period varies. In 60% of the plans It ends on the day of investment and
in the rest on the day before. Third, the date by which investment funds must reach the plan
administrator varies. Many firms permit funds to be tendered well beyond the point At which the
averaging period for determining price begins.
2It is possible, however, to sell short on each of the 5 days preceeding the purchase date.—7—
3. HIStOrICal Development of the Investment Program
Whether a 5% discount is agenerous inducementto shareholders to play the underwriting role
depends on the costs of participating in the plan. These include the costs ofbecoming informed about
the plan's details, the cost of bearing or avoiding undesiredmarket risks, the cost of monitoring the
investment, the transaction costs incurred in the secondary market, and thecost of complying with
margin requirements and tax laws. Because we faced so many uncertainties inimplementing our
investment strategies, we felt that simulating or otherwiseestimating our costs using exogenously
determined parameters would be too unreliable. As aconsequence, we document here some of these
costs from actual experience.
In August 1984, we obtained a prospectus for J. P.Morgan's discount program offering the
opportunity to invest up to $5,000 per month per account at a discount of 5%(actually 5/95 or 5.263%)
from market prices. This appeared to be sogenerous that we wondered why money didn't simply
pour in, reaching the capital target almost immediately.
We decided to find out first hand what some of thecosts to reap the "underwriting" discounts
must be.3 Since we knew there were other discountprograms as well, we decided to participate
modestly in a number of them to document their difkrences.
Our initial sources of data for discountprograms were Standard and Poor's Cumulative
Dividends, which included a table entitled "NYSE andASE Companies Offering Dividend
Reinvestment Plans" (pp. 162-3 in the 1984 volume), anda Money Magazine article entitled "No
This is a corollary of the Fama proposition. Thisproposition results from the apocryphal tale of the time
Eugene Paina, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago andone of the fathers of "efficient market
theory," was out strolling with acolleague.On being told that he had just walked past a twenty-dollar bill that
was lying on the sidewalk, Fama immediately replied, "Nonsense! If therewere a twenty-dollar bill lying there, it would already have been picked up."—8—
BrokerageFees, and Discounts Too" (Jordan E. Goodman, October 1983, pp. 171-2).We telephonedor
wroteto theadministratorsof some of theplansnamed for general information and prospectuses.
In September 1984,we purchased a single share ineachof tencompaniesthroughaMerrill
LynchSharebuilderaccount (maximum commission rate of 10% ofthe purchaseprice).The
investment totaled lessthan$400,and our commission was $33.06. Single shares in an additional
fifteencompanieswere purchasedinearlyOctober atacost of roughly$300. Sincevirtually all
programs require that participants be shareholders oI record, we instructed Merrill Lynch to transfer
shares out in one of our names.
It took three to six weeks for our stock certificates and the sign-up forms for the discount
programs to arrive. Eventually, welearnedthat investment could begin as soon as the plan
administrators recognized us as shareholders of record in their computers. This cut the delay from
the purchase of initial quali'ing shares to investment in discount shares to about two weeks.
On November 1, we made our first discount investments: $3,000 in HospitaL Corporation of
America (we could have invested $12,500) and $4,000 in Bankers Trust (the ceiling was $5,000).
Later that month, we made our first investment in seven other companies and our second investment
in HCA and Bankers Trust. Our total investment in November was $47,500.
Unless the investor requests a certificate for shares purchased, the sponsors retain the shares
"for safekeeping and convenience." Some program administrators will sell shares on request and
mail a check (or the proceeds, less a commission. We occasionally used this service, but we found
that we could secure better commissions through our own broker, and we believed our broker could
secure better execution of trades as well, particularly with limit orders. In any event, we typically
requested that a certificate for "all whole shares purchased with the enclosed investment" be
mailed out.—9—
InearlyDecember, we received our first certificates for shares purchased through the discount
programs. In the meantime, we had negotiated very favorable Commission rates with a San
Francisco broker.We promptly soldour shares as certificates were received, and deposited the net
proceeds in our bank account. The cycle had been completed, and the hidden costswe expected to
encounter never emerged. We were now ready to proceed to the nextstage of the investment strategy.
During December, we invested an additional $55,000 in various programs: In addition,we
purchased multiple shares in the programs that appeared to operate smoothly. Finally,we began to
search for additional discount programs. We consulted the April 1984 Directoryof Comnanies
Offering Dividend Reinvestment Plans, which listed names and addresses ofcompanies that
administer their own plans and plans for others.4
In January 1985, we began making investments in discountprograms in batches. With two
adults and two children in each household, our batch size wastypically eight: eight checks and
eight investment stubs indicating our intent to invest and our desire to have certificates for shares
mailed out. The checks were mailed in eight company-supplied
postage-paid first-class envelopes
or sent by overnight mail in a single envelope at our expense.
We used overnight mail to ensure that the plan administrator received the fundson the
requisite date,5 as well as to take advantage of the averaging rules many plans use to determine the
purchase price for new shares.
By using an optical scanneranda son/merge function of a word processing package, we were able to send
out within hours several hundred letters requestingprospectuses. This procedure turned up a number of
discount programs not identified in other data sources. Some time later,we came across an annual publication
put out by Evergreen Enterprises listing companies with dividend reinvestmentprograms. It specifically notes
those with cash discount programs. Although we learned of somenew programs from this source, we found it
contained somewhat dated information.
The date on which funds had to be received byprogram administrators often preceded the date on which
funds were invested by several days. We are cluite sure that in severalcases, funds received after the required
date were nevertheless accepted for investment. In one instance, however, fundswere returned for being too
late.— 10 —
We were surprised that many programs do not require investment funds to be tendered before
the averaging period starts. As a result, we were granted a valuable option. If share prices declined
during the averaging period, part or all of the discount could disappear, and we could choose not to
invest that period.6 This option is particularly valuable in plans that impose investmentceilings
over periods that cover more than one investment date. For example, it is common to allow
investment once a month with a maximum per account for any calendar quarter. lii theseprograms we
avoided investment in the first month of each calendar quarter unless the price on the day before the
required payment date had increased during the averaging period by a program-specific threshold
percentage. This strategy enabled us to increase our average discount above the 5.263% we would
have expected if we had ignored price behavior during the averaging period in makingour
investments. In one case, we were able to achieve a discount of 10% through strategictiming of
investment. In several other cases, we earned 8%7
Batch processing was just one of several refinements we made in our investmentstrategy in
January 1985. The others included (1) the purchase of insurance against price declines on our net
investment position; (2) the purchase of more than eight initial (qualifying) shares incompanies
offeflng new programs which enabled us to experiment with settingup more than eight investment
accounts although we had only eight social security numbers in our two immediate families; and (3)
the securing of lines of credit at local banks.
From time to time, we used three strategies toprotect ourselves against stock-price declines.
First we purchased in-the-money put options on the stocks in which we tooklong positions (e.&, J. P.
6 To illustrate,suppose the purchase price for shares is 95% of the average dosing price over the five days
ending just prior to the investment date. If these prices axe $2L00, $24.50, $25.00, $23.75, and $23.00, theavenge is $24.25, and the purchase price becomes 95% of thisavenge, or $230375. The dlscountaC purchase price of
the shares actually exceeds the last traded price of $23.00, and the effective discountbecomes a negative 0.16%. 7
Although we calculated optimal investment strategies for these averagirgprograms, we didnt always
implement them. The careful monitoring of daily price movements istune-consuming.— 11 —
Morgan, FirstChicago.HospitalCorporation of America).These specific hedges wereeffectivebut
expensive. The bid-ask spreads on finn-specific options are relatively high, as are the commissions.
One could easily spend 1% of the exposure in purchasing insurance in this fashion. Moreover, it is
time-consuming to implement these hedges.
Our second hedge was to sell short. This method, too, is effective but expensive, but here the
expense is of a different sort. We did not receive the proceeds from our short sales, and we were
required to pledge cash or securities as collateral. Although we put up $200,000 of personal capital,
it wasn't long before we faced a capital constraint even after margining our accounts. A number of
program sponsors have told us that short selling is common, particularly among investors who control
a large number of investment accounts. Apparently, such investors do not face the same capital
constraints we did.
Our initial motivation in using specific hedges, despite their cost, was to determine whether
sizable riskless profits could be secured. Once we established that riskiess profits of roughly 4% of
investment could be secured on a typical 5% discount program, we decided not to use these hedges
further, because the effective insurance premium (including transaction costs) exceeded the benefit
of price protection.
Specific hedges had another drawback Shares held for more than six months were eligible
for long-term capital gain treatment at federal tax rates capped at 20% in 1984-1986 venus 50%
otherwise.8 But a specific hedge prevents the holding period from running. Several of our firms
turned out to be merger targets giving rise to large capital gains. Where specific hedges were not
employed, we chose to hold for six months securities that had appreciated significantly in the three
8Actually, the gain could be taxed at 0% if the shares were used to make qualified charitable contributions,
an opportunity we chose to exploit for some of our appreciated shares. Some of these shares were used to
endowcharitabletrusts (e.g.. the Mark and Sheila Wolfson Philanthropic Fund). This enabled a tax deduction
tobe taken in 1986,at a federaltax rate of 50%, for charitable gifts to worthwhile causes to be madeIn yrs
after1986, whentaxrates were scheduled to be well below 50%.— 12 —
tofive weeks between our investment and our receipt of a certificate for shares purchased. As a
result, long-term capital gains comprise 65% of our total capital gains.9
Our third hedgewasa macro hedge, in which we simply purchased actively traded put
options on a market index. This enabled us to sleep reasonably comfortably at night even when, at its
peak, our total investment in stocks exceeded $500,000. Still, industry-specific and finn-specific risk
were not well hedged throughout most of the period, and we did suffer one disaster, a $16A) loss on
a $34,000 investment in Banks of Mid-America in 1986. In all, the three hedging strategies gave rise
to gross losses of $27,000 from short sales and put options.
Restrictions on Investment Accounts
We realized early that economies of scale were significant in our operations. The most
important costs were fixed: the time we spent learning of programs' existence, about when and where
to invest and about when to sell securities. Because our investments across accounts were "carbon
copies,: there were great economies in record-keeping as well.
There were also large economies of scale in brokerage commissions. Our brokeragreed to sell
the shares in our eight accounts in a single trade through a singlebrokerage account, cutting eight
separate checks for the proceeds.10 The brokerage fee was the same whether shares were sold for
two or eight separate shareholders. This enabled us to trade at commissionsavenging less than one-
quarter of 1 percent of the market value of the shares sold, with many trades at less than one-eighth
of 1 percent.11
The discount from market price at which shares are sold to ipants is taxed as dividend income, not
capital gains. In fact, this dividend income is even eligible for the dividends-received deduction (which has
ranged from 70% to 85% over the 1984-1988 period) for corporate investors. This makes most of the discount
income tax exempt at the corporate level.
10 To minimizeconfusion among the taxing authorities, we constructed a spreadsheet tracing each sale to the
specific shareholders. This became our so-called 1099-B reconciliation schedule, acopy of which was filed with each of our tax returns.
This Is the round-trip commission cost, since sharesacquired directly though the discount program are commission-free.— 13—
Giventhesescale economies, we tested whetherwe couldset up more accounts in some
programs than the eight we already had. We found plans varied tremendously in their willingness
to tolerateproliferation of accounts. A couple of plans openly encouraged multiple accounts, with
administrators telling us by phone that some investors had many more accounts in their plan than we
did. For example, several large banks have had more than one investor with between 50 and 100
related accounts. These investors routinely invested the maximum allowed per account and quickly
turned over the shares to arbitrage the discount income. Other plans were less sanguine about this
practice. Consider the following:
'Optional cash payments received in excess of $12,500 per calendar
quarter purported to be invested in multiple accounts for the benefit of the
same Participant will be returned, without interest, if the company
reasonably determines that the same Participant is. through the opening
of multiple accounts, investing an aggregate of more than $12,500 in any
calendar quarter."
(Hospital Corporation of America, Supplement to
Prospectus dated 8/26/82. Supplement dated 1/17/84. p.1)
Similar sentiments are reflected in the prospectuses of California Real Estate Investment Trust
(9/3/85. p. 16), New JerseyNationalBank (7/16/84, pp. 5-6), and Storage Equities (8/30/85, p. 10).
Most plans did not include language such as that reported above, however, and the use of
multiple accounts was publicly acknowledged by some administrators. For example, according to the
administrator of treasury services at TECO Energy, a number of investors established multiple
accounts to circumvent the limits on cash payments. (Source: Wall Street loumal. 4/26/86, p. 33) The
director of shareholder relations for Indian Head Banks, in a letter to shareholders announcing the
termination of cash discounts, stated that arbitrage and multiple accounts were the primary reasons
for cancelling the program.— 14 —
To establish whether multiple accounts could be used, we created revocable trusts.12 We
invested a total of $96,000 of trust hinds through the discount programs of seven companies.
We sought legal counsel on the use of these thists to augment our participation in some discount
programs, and were assured of their legality. None of the companies in which trust investments were
made restricted multiple accounts in their prospectuses. Moreover, none of these companies ever
questioned our eligibility even though we mailed checks and investment stubs in the same Federal
Expressenvelope used for the other eight accounts. Once we established that additional accounts
were possible, we stopped using them.
Securing Lines of Credit
Once we began investing in batches, we soon faced a capital constraint. Inresponse, we
arranged for lines of credit totaling $300,000: a $200,000 line at prime plus 15% and a $100,000 line
at prime plus 2.0%. Our borrowing never exceeded 50% of our total investment because of margin
rules.
The credit lines were terminated at the end of 1986. During the twoyears in which they were
active, we accumulated $14,000 in interest expense. At an average interest rate of 12%, this
translates to an avenge loan balance of about $58,000. The actual amount fluctuatedconsiderably.
Indeed, at some points we held substantial cash positions, generating $7,000 of interest income over
these two years. Since idle cash yielded interest at roughly 2% belowprime, we were careful to pay
down our loans before accumulating cash. At anaverage interest rate of 8%, our avenge cash balance
was on the order of $44,000, or $14,000 less than the average size of our loan)3
12 A revocable trust Isa trust controlled by the grantor or another designated trustee. Assets can be added to
or removed from the trust at any time. We were able to obtain additional tax identification numbers byusing these trusts, and this was a requirement to setup additional accounts in some programs. For each trust, we
designated a 5% income beneficiary and named the trust after thatperson. We retained the residual interest
in the trust income and assets.
13 The 514,000excess of average loan position over average cash balance is equal to the $14,000 of gross
interest expense on our loans only by coincidence.— 15—
ChangesIn the Level of Investment Activity Over Time
Table 5 reports that we invested through the discount programs of 30companies over the 1984-
1988 period. For all but two finns, we invested positive amounts in three or fewer of the fiveyears.
primarily because discounts were eliminated.14 We invested in only one calendaryear in eleven
firms, two calendar years in eleven firms, three calendar years in six firms, four calendaryears in one
firm, and all five calendar years in one finn. We invested in 14 firms in 1984, 22 firms in 1985, 17
finns in 1986, three firms in 1987, and four finns in 1988. Although we invested over $2 million in
1985, we invested just under $1 million in 1986 and $100,000 in 197.
Our total initial investment over the five-year period for any given firmranged from a low of
$3,000 to a high of $400,000. For any given year. initial investment in individual firmsranged from
a low of $1,000 to a high of $370,000. The $370,000 was invested in J. P. Morgan in 1985. Morgan's
discount was terminated in October 1985. The $370,000 investment was the result ofinvesting $5,000
per month in eight accounts for eight months plus $5,000 in ten accounts for one month. A total of
$315,000 was invested in Bank of New England, also in 1985. Like J. P. Morgan the bank terminated
its discount late in 1985. The news of such terminations brought us about as much cheeras the receipt
of an IRS audit notice. In table 6 we list the stocks in which we acquired initial shares but madeno
further investments. In most cases, these companies tenninated their discounts beforewe could buy
shares.
While we knew of a number of other programs, all were less attractive to us than thosewe
initially patronized.1S Some programs in which we did not participate imposed investment ceilings
14Thetwo-year investment hiatus in South Jersey Industries in 1986 and 1987 resulted from the termination
of discounts at theend of 1985,followed by their renewal in 1988.
15We are aware of tenprograms that were still active at year-end 1988 and a few programs that were initiated in
1989.— 16 —
that we believed were too small to justify the cost of time and ecplidt transaction costs. In others,
the discount was less than 5%.
In principle, a 3% discount program was quite profitable, but not generous enough to
compensate for our time given the modest scale at which we invested. Our out-of-pocket expenses
consisted primarily of brokerage fees and execution costs. Execution costs arise because we expect to
buy shares at prices that represent an average of the bid and ask prices, while we are likely to sen
shares in the market at prices closer to prevailing bid prices.
Recent evidence shows that the bid-ask spread, in relation to market prices, decreases with
greater trading volume and with higher market value of outstanding equity; for large, actively
traded firms, the spread is less than 1% Isee Sirri (1989) and Barclay and Smith (1988)1. Evidence
also suggests that nearly 40% of all trades on the New York and American Stock Exchanges may occur
within the bid-ask spread. Although we were not able to document it, we believe that many of our
trades (both market orders and limit orders) were executed within the bid-ask spread. Moreover, we
are confident that the weighted avenge bid-ask spread for our firms was under 1%. As a result,
03% would seem to be a conservative upper bound estimate of our execution costs. On the other hand,
by checking trading volumes and the size of bid-ask spreads, we estimated that the execution costs to
trade shares in gjg programs were more than 2%, and we avoided investing in these plait.
Another reason for not investing in certain programs was that they required considerable
monitoring to determine whether a reasonable discount was available. CAL RET, for example.
offers shares at a 5% discount, but its formula for calculating the market price requires numerous
tedious calculations. The prospectus even warns that the discount could be negative36
"The Market Price is the highest of the following sales of prices: (a) theaverage of the High aitd Low Sale
Pnces of the Common Shares, as quoted under the American Stock Exchange Composite Transactions, on the
date the distribution is declared; 1W the average of the Daily Closing Prices of the Common Shares, as so
quoted, for a period of ten (10) trading days prior to the distribution payment date (the Investment Date); and
(c) the average of the High and Low Sale Prices of the Common Shams, as so quoted, on the Investment Date.
If no Common Shares are traded on the relevant distribution declaration date or Investment Date for purposes— 17 —
Twootherfactorscontributed to our sabbatical from investing in 1987. First, a regulatory
change applying to brokers precluded our trades from being merged into a single transaction after
December 31, 1986. This increased our proportional brokeragefeedramatically. For thetrades
undertaken in 1988, our brokeragefee still avengedwell under one-halfofonepercent, butif we had
undertaken the same trades in 1985 and 1986 under the post-December 31,1986 rules, our commissions
wouldhave beenthree to four times as large as the 0.22% rate we incurred in those years (for an
additionalcostof $15,000-$20,000).
The final factorrelatesto family tax planning. Beforetheeffectivedate of theTax Reform
Actof1986,thedividends andcapitalgainsearned in our children's names were taxable at bargain
rates.As of January1, 1987, this wasnolongertrue for two children.17
StockPrice Performance for Firms In which We Investrd
One concern we had was that part of our discount would be lost to poor stock performance. We
cannot address this question definitively, but our anecdotal evidence suggests that, if anything, we
outperfonned comparable firms not offering discount programs.
Table 7 shows that we generated $190,000 of gross discount income. $25,000 of dividend income
and $215,000 of capital gains. From this $430,000 of gross income we subtract net interest expense of
$7,000 and $2,000 of other expenses, leaving $421,000 in net profits.
How does our nondiscount income compare with what we would have earned if we had
investedalternatively?Ninety percent ofourinvestment was concentrated around 1985-1986
of calculating the Market Price, the daily High and Low Sale Prices shall be determined on the basis of the most
recent prior date on which Common Shares were traded."
(CAL Prospectus. 9/3/85, p.7)
Page 15 of the CAL REIT prospectus warns in italics that the discount could theoretically turn out to be a
negative one.
17Children under fourteen now pay tax essentially at their parents marginal tax rates.— 18—
(includingyear-end 1984 and the beginning of 1987). and over 70% of our fundswerecommitted to
bankstocks. During this period, an investment in the Standard & Poors 500 index would have
returned 56%, including dividends. The SalomonBrothers indexof 35 bank stocks returned 59%. We
were actually somewhat moreheavilyinvested during 1985 and the first half of 1986 than during
thesecond half of1986. The S&P 500 stocks returned 59% in the six quarters ending in mid-1986, and
theSalomon Brothersbankstocks returned 76%. S&P 500stocks then fellby 2% in the secondhalfof
1986 andthebankstockindexfell by9%.We were virtually outofthemarketin 1987andbegan
investingagain early in 1988. Thisprovedquite lucky: bank stockslost17%in1987 andgained23%
in 1988.
To estimatewhether ourinvestment in discount programsunderperformeda naive investment
strategy, we assumed that our investment alternative wouldhave simplybeentoinvest in the
SatomonBrothers BankStock Index. Thesecalculations are shownin panel B of table 8.
Weinvested $200,000 at the start of 1985. 11 we had left this entire amount invested in the
indexthroughout 1985 and 1986 we would have realized a return of 59%, or $118,000 in excessofour
initialinvestment.At theend ofJune 1986, however,we withdrew $150,000. This wouldhave saved
us$13,500, because the index declinedby 9%overthesecond half of 1986. We also invested our gross
discount incomeofapproximately $171,500 during 1985and1986.Onaverage, approximately half,
or $86,000, was invested throughout the entire period. An investment in the SalomonBrothers index
would have returned$50,700on thisaverage investment over the period. Finally,ournet borrowing
overthe period averaged $14,000, andwewouldhaveearned $8,300 on this investment.
Wewithdrew our entire investment at the beginning of 1987. Anaverage investment of
$90,000 in 1988 would have returned $20,700 if invested In the bank stock index.— 19 —
Aftersubtracting our hedging losses and transaction costs, we estimate that we could have
earned $182,600 by investing in the bank stock index rather than in the stocks weactually held. We
call this the net benchmark return. This is a conservative benchmark in that 25% ofour actual
investment was in industry sectors that underperformed bank stocks.
Turning to panelA oftable S we see that the actual return was $257,200 more than the
$163,800 of net discount income we earned. Net discount income is estimated to be 5.26% of the
$3,609,000 invested less the costs to sell shares (including both brokerage fees of 0.22% and execution
costs of 0.50%).
The $257200 of nondiscount income is $74,600 above the benchmark return. With anaverage
investment of approximately $250,{E0 per year for two years and $90,000 for a thirdyear, the excess
return (above the benchmark) is 12% per year. So the concern that discount income would, inpart,
disappear because of poor stock performance for the sponsoring firms was not borne out by our
experience. The favorable stock perfonnance for firms offering discount stock purchase plans is
somewhat surprising and is worthy of further investigation. Are there common characteristicsacross
these firms, not recognized by the market ejg thatcaused them to perfonn so well?
4. Decentralized Investment Banking
Firms can raise equity capital in myriad ways, including conventional underwritings of
common or preferred shares, equity rights offerings, warrant offerings, convertible bond and preferred
stock offerings, share issuances to purchase assets or shares inmergers and acquisitions, and awards
of shares (or contingent claims to shares) to employees through retirementplans and incentive
compensation arrangements. In principle, issuing shares directly to shareholders at a discount can
make shareholders better off than they would be under conventional underwritings. if the discount
offered to shareholders is similar to the fee an underwriter would charge, and if the post-issuance— 20 —
value of the firm is identical with the alternative methods of raising capital, the discount plan can
be viewed as offering shareholders a dividend bonus. But this analogy can be taken only so far,
because most shareholders do not participate in discountprograms,the right to purchase shares at a
discount is typically not related to the level of share ownership (unlike rights offerings) and the
plans do not prevent new shareholders from purchasing small ownership interests in the secondary
market and then supplying a disproportionate amount of the new capital at bargain prices.
How Much Money is Raised through Discount Frograms?
Table 9 reports capital amounts raised through dividend reinvestment plans in 1985 for two
categories of firms. In the first category are eight finns offering 5% discounts on optional cash
purchases of shares throughout the entire calendar year (1985) and that reported the amounts raised
as a separate line item in their annual reports.18 The seven firms in the second group make similar
financial statement disclosures but offer no discounts on cash purchases.
The eight firms offering 5% discounts raised through their programs an average of 98%
(median; the mean is 93%) of the common and preferred dividends they paid in 1985. By contrast,
the seven firms offering no discounts raised an average of 12% (median; the mean is 14%) of their
common and preferred dividends.
United Water Resources and Hexcel offer less generous investment opportunities than the
other six finns offering 5% discounts. Although the table does not show it, these firms' common
stocks are also less actively traded than the stocks of the other firms, making execution costs higher.
Accordingly, the capital raised for these finns, as a fraction of common and preferred dividends, is
just above 50%, or less than half as much raised by the other firms offering 5% discounts.
t8Many finns lump the amount raised through theseprograms with amounts raised in altenative ways. These
firms are excluded from the table.— 21 —
Theother finnthatstands out is Hanford National. Although this is a large firm that
offered generous investment limits and whose shares traded actively, the program raised only 51%
of common and preferred dividendsin 1985. The onlyclue we have to explain this discrepancy is
that Hartford National was notably slower in 1985 than were other firms in sending us certificates
for shares we bought through the discount program. If our experience is typical, this slowness
discouraged shareholder investment.
Over the nine months of 1985 in which J. P. Morgan offered a discount program, it raised $92
million through its dividend reinvestment plan (or 44% of common and preferred dividends paid for
the entire year). In 1986, in the absence of a discount cash purchase option. $55 million was raised
through the reinvestment plan (only 23% of common and preferred dividends).
The decline in capital raised through the Bank of New England's dividend reinvestment plan
was even more dramatic. In 1986, in the absence of a discount, only $8.3 million was raised (down
from $41.7 million in 1985). This is only 15% of common and preferred dividends (down from 96% in
1985).
Investors clearly respond to the opportunity to buy new shares for cash at a discount, but a
substantial majority of shareholders do not exercise their option to purchase shares at a discount. It
ispuzzlingthat finns are willing to incur such high costs to pay dividends and then issue an
offsetting amount of new equity. Not only is there the familiar tax cost of paying dividends, but here
we also have the administrative cost of running the discount program, the transaction costs
associated with resales of shares in the secondary market, and perhaps most important, the cost to
existing shareholders of offering 5% discounts to new shareholders. Although the answer may
relate to concern over adverse stock market responses to cuffing dividends or floating an equity issue
through an underwriter, these phenomena are not well understood and deserve closer attention.— 22—
AreShort-Term Traders Really Welcome?
Apparently, firms have objectives other than raising capital in sponsoring discount stock-
purchase programs. Some are interested in promoting long-term investment by shareholders. Others
appear interested in encouraging wider ownership of shares, perhaps to make a change in corporate
control more difficult to effect. And with the possible exception of BankAmerica and a couple of
other large banks, all finns seem to be concerned about the effect on share prices of arbitrage by plan
participants.
Although a few program sponsors seem content to have shareholders purchase shares at a
discount and then sell them quickly, others clearly oppose such activity. Excepts from prospectuses
for firms in the latter category appear below:
If it appears to Chesebrough that a participant has used, is using or may be
using the optional cash payment feature to generate short-term profits or (act)
otherwise with an effect that, in the sole judgment and discretion of
Chesebrough, is not in the best interests of Chesebrough or Chesebrough's other
shareholders, then Chesebrough may decline to issue all or any portion of the
shares of Chesebrough Common Stock for which any optional cash payment by
or on behalf of such participant is tendered.
(Chesebrough Ponds, Prospectus. 5/22/85, p. 8)
The antiarbitrage language in these prospectuses is apparently not entirely without content.
Our efforts to help Chesebrough Ponds raise capital were, after a number of months of faithful
investment, rewarded with a six-month suspension of four of our eight accounts. We received no
suspensions from any other company, and our investments were never refused. We never received a
single letter of warning from program sponsors.
At the other extreme from Chesebrough Ponds is BankAmerica. It entered the discount
program business relatively recently, Introducing its Shareholder Investment Plan In June, 1987. The
plan permitted shareholders of record to invest up to $10,000 per month in common shares at a 5%
discount from market prices. The plan was so popular that BankAmerica decided to reduce the
discount to 4% a mere four months later.— 23 —
In June 1988, the discount was reduced further (03% and the bank announced that participants
could request permission to invest more than $10,000 per month.19 We inquired by phone whether an
investmentof$100,000 in the forthcoming month would be allowed. The answer was yes, but the
plan administrators would not reveal what the investment ceiling might be.
The June 1988 amendment contained another change making it clear that the bank was
primarily interested in using the discount program to raise equity capital at low cost: it allowed
participants to enter standing orders to have the bank sell their shares immediately after
investment. The plan administrator would then simply send a check for the proceeds less a
brokerage commission.
BankAmerica raised over $150 million from its discount program in the lint year. In
September 1988, iust fifteen months after the program was introduced, the discount rate was cut for
the third time, to 2.5%. And in February 1989, when more than $350 million had been raised in just
over a year and a half at an average discount rate of well below 4%, the discount was reduced once
again, this time to 2%.
The BankAmerica program raises an interesting tradeoff between equity and efficiency
considerations. While a relatively few well-endowed shareholders are likely to dominate the
plan, they are also likely to be the most efficient 'underwriterc of the firm's securities, and at a 2%
discount, the total underwriting fee paid is 60% less than that incurred in the 5% discount program.
19 It also announced that optional cash payments could be made electronically using the banks Home
BankingTM or Business connectionlM systems.— 24 —
Corporate Finance Implicationsof Dividend-Reinvestmentand DiscountStock-Purchase Plans
The evidencein section3suggests that raising equity capitalthrougha discount stock-
purchase plan does not lower a finns stock price. A negative valuation effect could be capitalized
into the price of the stock, however, when the plan is announced. We did, not investigate this
possibility, but some related evidence in Dubofsky and Bierman (1988) is worth citing. They find, for
a sample of 46 firms announcing the initiation of discount dividend reinvestment plans (DRP)
between 1975 and 1983, and for which no other Wall Street Journal news items were reported in the
three days surrounding the DRP announcements, that common stock returns, in excess of the market,
were statistically significantly positive on the announcement by an amount avenging one-third to
one-half percent.
These results contrast with the documented announcement effects of underwritten stock and
stock rights issues. Asquith and Mullins (1983) report a -3.14% abnormal two-day return for
industrial stocks and a -0.75% abnonnal two-day return (or utilities on the announcement of new
equity issues. Eckbo and Masulis (1989), updating the results in Smith (19Th on underwritten stock
and stock rights issues through 1981. find a significant -3.3% abnormal return on the announcement of
an underwritten industrial offering, approximately twice the abnormal return on a rights offering.
These negative returns are for the entire outstanding equity of the firm and may represent a
large fraction (in some cases more than 100%) of the new equity being issued.
We learns from our conversations with the sponsors of discount stock-purchase plans that the
negative response to an announced equity offering is an important consideration in decisions to raise
equity through a stock-purchase plan. It has been noted that the stock-price decline may be
attributable to investor concern that equity is being issued because management has private
Information suggesting that the stock is overpriced (see, for example, Myers and MajIuf (1984)). But
if management wants to raise equity capital and does not havenegative inside information,
committing the firm to raise money to finance a future project over a period of months or years, rather— 25—
than all at once, may mitigate the adverse selection problem.Raisingcapital over time allows some
of the information management has when the plan to raise equity is announced to be reflected in
publicly disclosed accounting measures of performance and other outlets, thereby reducing
informationasymmetries.
This mayhelp to explainwhyfirmslimittheamountofstock investors may purchaseat a
discount.This practice slows down the rate at which funds are raised, which may enable the firm to
issue equity without incurring the loss in the market value that typically accompanies conventional
underwritten equity issues. So discount stock-purchase plans can be viewed as a form of sunshine
trading,! wherein firms announce to the market that they wish to raise a given amount of capital but
give shareholders some control over the rate at which it is raised. Although this remains
conjectural, it would be interesting to determine whether this is an important motivation for stock
purchase plans.
Smith (1986) has argued that the more severe the information asymmetry between managers
and outside securityholders the greater the demand for the monitoring and certification services of
an investment banker. The discount of 5.26% offered to shareholders in discount stock-purchase plans
is similar to the direct costs incurred in using the services of an underwriter. But the discount stock
purchase plan allows some of the discounts to be earned by current shareholders, and these plans
appear to avoid a negative impact on stock prices. Eckbo and Masulis (1989) estimate the total
expenses of firm commitment offerings (where the investment banker bears the risk of stock-price
uncertaintywhilestock is being distributed in the marketplace) to be 4.9% over the period 1963-
1981. These costs appear to averagebetween3% and 4% in the Eckbo and Masulis sample for the
dollar range of offerings encompassed by our stock purchase programs. These expenses include direct
issue costs other than investment banking fees that average under 1%.—26—
While Bhagat, Man and Thompson (1985) estimate that the introduction of Rule 415 (shelf
registration)2° in March 1982 reduced fees significantly (15-50%. depending upon how one interprets
their data), this estimate results from comparingunderwriting costs offirms that used shelf
registration from those that did not, and these finns seem likely to differ along dimensions not
captured in the study.
Table 10 shows the underwriting costs by size of offer and year of offering for the post-shelf
registration years 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 (through mid-June of 1989). for all common stock issues
and bank common stock issues, other than initial public offerings. The data come from Securities
Data Corporations New Issues Service. In the $20-$50 million range for share issues, the fees
(excluding direct issue costs) are 4.5% to 5.0% of issue size, somewhat higher than those reported by
Eckboand Masulisfor the pre-shelf registration period. Fees for shares issued by banks are
somewhat smaller,typically3.5% to 4%. So while discount stock-purchase programs are not
directly comparable to underwritten offerings as a mechanism for raising new capital,thedirect cost
of the two mechanisms appeartobe similar, and discount programs both appear to avoid market
impactcostsandallowsomeofthe underwriting fees to be earned by existing shareholders.
5. Concluding Remarks
Developing the raw data on which this case study is based was fun (at least for a while).21
The experiment allowed us not only to test whether we could earn abnormal profits based on publicly
available information, it also led us to consider why firms would use discount stock-purchase
programs with restrictions on investor participation. At a discount rate of 5%, the programs in
which we participated offered substantial profit opportunity, especially to investors choosing to
In a shelf registration, firms can register securities in advance of an issue and update the registration
documents only if information has changed since the last registration. This allows a finn to market a new issue
more quickly than if it had to secure new Securities and Exchange Commission approval.
21 But the next time we considerundertaking "case research" we hope it will be a little less labor intensive.
Putting together a 20 page single-spaced typed schedule of capital gains and losses for our 1985 tax returns was
not enjoyable.— 27 —
exploit the natural economies of both scale (for a given plan) and scope (across plans) available.
Since most shareholders do not participate in these plans (and therefore do not share in the
discounts) the question arises whether a 5% discount is too generous to maximize the welfare of
current shareholders. The elimination of discounts on optional cash purchases in so many plans
(particularly in 1986) is consistent with this speculation.
Another explanation for termination of cash discounts is simply that firms raised the target
level of capital. Given the profits we (and presumably others) made, firms might have been able to
raise the same amount of capital at less direct cost to shareholders by reducing the size of the
discount and increasing investment limits, as BankAmerica and a few others have done. On the
other hand, if there is value in slowing down the rate at which capital is raised, allowing large
investors to acquire shares too quickly could exact an adverse selection-related cost by depressing
share prices. But if capital is required for immediate investment, raising capital slowly may not be
viable.
Some of the finns we spoke with found discount purchase programs a highly cost-effective
means of raising capital. Others had less favorable experiences. They were unhappy that they
could not control the behavior of arbitrageurs who established many accounts and invested more
capital than the sponsoring firms would have preferred. A number of sponsors observed that their
investment bankers discouraged them from using these programs, although they were aware of the
potential conflicts of interest that could motivate such warnings. After all, the investment banks
lose underwriting fees if these programs displace conventional underwritings. As banks and other
capital-hungry companies gear up for the next round of capital raising, it will be interesting to see
whether the discount stock purchase plans play an important role, and if so, how much, how often,
and at what discount shareholders an permitted to invest— 28 —
TableI
Di*ibu don by lndustiy of Cash lnvnthtent In Common Stocks





Category Bank RUT UtilityOther Total FirmInvestment
($000) ($000)
21 4 9 4 38 $ 0 $ 0
11 8 5 1 0 14 0 0
2 1 2 0 5 >0-6 24
1 3 0 1 5 >6-50 182
2 0 1 2 5 >50-100 371
4 2 - 0 1 7 >100-150 899
3 0 0 0 3 >150-200 573
1 0 1 0 2 >200-300 530
_Q _Q _1 >300-400jQ
24 11 5 4 44 $3609=
1+11 45 15 14 8 82 = —








Category 1: firms in which we did not become shareholdersofrecord and thus were
ineligible to participate in discount programs.
Category 11: finns in which we did become shareholders of record, although, as the table
reveals, we chose to invest through the discount programs of only 30 of these 44 firms.
Category 111: all but the first two rows of Category II finns.— 29 —
Table2
Frequency Distribution of 82 Common Stock Purchase Plans.
by Maximum Cash Purchase Allowed per Account and Discount from Market Price
for the Period 1954_1988a
(Table Values Correspond to Number of Firms that Fall into Each Category)
Discount from Market Price
Purchase Purchase total No.
Frequency Limit b of Firms
Monthly $1,000 4 4
2,000 1 I 2
5,000 6 6
10,000 .:i —
TotalNumberofFinns 12 1 13 a a —
Quarterly $ 1,000 3 3
2,000 6 6




5,000 20 1 1 22
6,000 1 1




TotatNumberofFinns 43 1 3 1 1 49 —— — a — a
Yearly $ 3,000 1 1
20,000 1 1
30,000 1 1
40,000 — _i ._j.
Total Number of Firms 2 2 4 — a —
TotalNumberofFirms 57 1 4 1 3 66
Data not available
62
a Several plans changed the maximum investment amount and/or discount over time. These (inns
are reflected in the table at the terms contained in the earliest discount program prospectus we have.
b Although these three plans offer no discount from the calculatedprice of shares, the price is
based on an average of prices over a number of days (ranging from 5 to 20), and payment may be made
just priortothe end of the averaging period. As a result, the effective discount can be generous.— 30—
Table3
Frequency Distribution of Maximum Annual Cash Investment Amount Permitted




Range of Annual Investment. I ProgramsProgramsPrograms
tc$1O,000 9 1 10
$10,000,<1< $20,000 4 10 14
$20,000,<J< $25,000 1 20 1 22
$25,000, <ic $50,000 1
$50,000,clc$100,000 6 2 8
I$100,000 __i __i —a
12 43 2 57=— 31 —
Table4
Formulae to Determine Purchase Price of Shares and
Thning of Payment Req uiremenb
Number of Firms Usinç Advance
Averaging Period Payment Numberof Last Average Average Eadsonflay Require-
Days PricesTraded High andClosing Bid & Of Preceding ment













2 1 x 5
















15 1 x 41
20 1 x I
2 4




Formulae to DeterminePurchase Priceof Shares and
'flming of Payment Requirements
b me advance payment requirement varies month to month, averaging four days.
COneof these finns initially set the price equal to the average dosingbid price on thefive days
preceding the investment date. This was later changed to the average of the bid andthe ask price,
effectively reducing the discount by one-half of the bid-ask spread.
d This firm requiredadvance paymentat least ten business days preceding the investment date.
However, funds were refundable up to 48 hours prior to the investment, so the effective advance
payment requirement is two days. This is important in detennining the effective discount,since the
investment can be avoided if prices decline during the first eight days of the averaging period.
eAdvance payment requirement varies with the dividend record and dividend payment dates.
The advance payment requirement varies month to month, averaging four days. Despite the 15-
dayaveraging, the advance payment requirement was waived by phone one month when the price
had risen substantially, making the discount approximately 10%.
g The advance payment requirement varies, month to month, averaging four days. The averaging
period for these two companies also varies. More precisely, it is the average closing price for the
entire month preceding the investment.— 33—
Table5
Cash Investment Amounts In Common Stocks Purchased At a Discount
Through Stock Purchase Plans by Him and Year
(inthousands of $)
1984 19851986 19871988Total
1. BankArnerica 200 2(X)
2. Bank of New England 315 315
3. Banks olMid-Ainerica 34 IC) 44
4. Bankers Trust 13 185 198
5. Chesebrough Ponds 54 32
6. Columbia Gas 5 5
7. Chemical Bank 5
8.CSX 5 120 12 137
9. FirstofAmericaBank 5 125 160 290
10.First American of Tennessee 36 48 84
11.FirstChicago 145 145
12.First Union 10 105 60 175
13.HospitalCorporationof America 253 123 38
14.Hartford Nationai/Shawmut Nat'l 5 50 160 40 60 315
15. Hubbard Real Estate 3 3
16.Hexcel I 32 61
17. Indian Head Banks 2 36 48 32 118
18.J. P. Morgan 30 371) 4(K)
19. KogerCo. 40 40
20. Koger Properties 40 40
21.Muitibank Financial 5 5
22. Meridian Bancorp 16 96 112
23. NewJerseyNational 90 40 130
24. PropertyTrustCo.ofArnerica 20 20
25. Santa Anita Realty 4 64 64 132
26.Signet Bank/Bank of Virginia 32 24 56
27.StorageEquities S &) 40 125
28. South Jersey Industries 160 80 240
29. TECO Energy 6 6
30. United WaterResources — W —— 84
Total 118320823962 96 350 3609 —C— — — =
...Continued...— 34 —
Confinuationof TableS
Numberof Firms In WhICh InvesUnents Were Made.
In only one calendar year 11
In two different years 11
In three different years 6
In four different years
In five different years





During 1988 4— 35 —
Table 6
Firms with DiscountPrograms in Which NoInvestmentsWere Made















Firms In which no shares were purchased:t
1.Bancorp Hawaii
2.Bank of New York


























29.PNB Mortgage and Realty Trust
30.ProMed Capital








a In most cases,
received our shares.
the reason for not investing is that cash discounts were terminated before we
b Thereasons for not investing Include: (1) discount program terminated by the time we found out
about it; (2) Investment limits too small to compensate us for the value of our time; (3) estimated
bid-ask spreads too large (rendering execution costs too high) to justify investment; and (4) discounts
of less than 5%.— 36—
Table7
Profitability and Aggregate Cash Invested in Common Shares at a Discount
Through Stock Purchase Plans by 'Year
(In thousands of $)
Investment Taxable Short-Term thng-Tenn Total
Year Amount Dividends& Capital Capital Capital
Discount Gainst' cain? cain?
Incomea
1984 $1185$5 $0 $0$0
1985 20815 125 34 0 34
1986 962 64 25 97 122
1987 96 4 2 4 6
1988 _jz
Total $3609 $140 $215
Dividends plus capital gains $ 430
Interest income 7
lnterestexpense (14)
Other Investment expenses (2)
Net profit
a Discount income is taxedas dividend income. The total gross discount income is approximately
$190,000, and total dividend income is approximately $25,000.
b Capitalgains are net of brokerage commissions of $10,000, execution costs of perhaps twice this
amount, and losses in 1985 of $27,000 from short sales and the purchase of put options.— 37—
Table8
Actual Return versus Benchmark Return on lnvesbnent
Panel A
Actual return: $ 421,000
Subtract expected net discount income
Grossdiscount perdollarinvested 5.26%
Lessbrokeragefee(oneway) 0.22%
Lessexecution cost (one way) 0.50%
Netdiscount per dollar invested 4.54%
Net discount on $3,609,000 invested 163J00
Actual return in excess of net discount income 257,200
Expected return in excess of net discount income due
to the increase in bank stock prices
(This is the "net benchmark return" from Panel B.) 382,oa)
Excess of actual over benchmark return beyond the
net discount income $74,6CC
NOTE:On an average investment of approximately $250,OG1 per year for two years and $90,L)O0 for a
third year, this excess return is 12% per year.
....Continued....— 38 —
Continuationof Table 8
Actual Return versus Benchmark Return on Investment
Panel B
Period BenchmarkBenchmark
Investment Investment Rate of Total
Source Date Amount Investment Return Return
Initial 1/1/85-
investment 1/1/85 $ 200,000 12/31/86 59% +$118,000
Withdrawal 7/11% 150,000 7/1/84
12/31/86 -9% + 13,500
Reinvestment of
gmesdiscount (a) 86,000 1/1/85-
income 12/31/86 59% + 50,700
Investment
financedby (b) 14,000 1/1/85-
lineofcredit 12/31/86 59% + 8,300
New investment 1/1/88 90,000 1/1/88-
12/31/88 23% + 20,700
Gross benchmark return $211,200
Hedginglosses -27,000
Brokeragefees and
executioncosts @ .25% and .50%, respectively -1.600
Netbenchmark return $I82,600
(a) $3,259,00 invested at a discountofapproximately 5/95 yields $171,500 of gross discount income.
On average, approximately half or $86,000 is investedthroughout the entire period.
(b) $14,000 is the avenge excess of borowings over cash held over thepesiod 1/1/85-12/31/86.— 39—
Table9
AmountsRaisedthrough Dividend Reinvestment Plans in 1985
I. FirmsofferIng 5% cash purchase discounts throughout 1985, disclosing amounts raised
asa separate line item in their annual report
Amount Raised As a Fraction of
Investment (In Millions Common and Fret erred
Company Ceiling of dollars) Dividend Payments
Bank ofNewEngland $ 5,lXXWmo. $ 41.7 96%
First of America 5,000/qtr. 14.9 100%
First Union 3,000-
l0,000/qtr. 44.8 109%
Hartford National 5,000/qtr. 16.4 51%
Hexcel 1.000/qtr. 1.4 51%
New JerseyNational 5JY30/qtr. 6.7 103%
Storage Equities 5,000/qlr. 18.9 178%
UnitedWater Resources 3.000/qtr. 5.2 54%
Median(mean) capital raised as a fraction of dividends:98% (93%).
U. Firms that appear on the Bank Compustat tape (150 banks) offering dividend
reinvestment programs without a discount cash purchase feature, disclosing amounts raised as a
separate line item In their annual report
AmountRaised As a Fraction of Common and
Company (In Millions of Dollars) Preferred Dividend Payments
Bank of Boston $ 12.7 22%
Citizen & Southern 4.9 12%
First Jersey National 1.1 8%
First Security 05 4%
Irving Bank 4.7 11%
NCNB 8.2 18%
United Virginia BankShares 4.6 21%
Median (mean) capital raised as a fraction of dividends: 12% (14%).— 40—
Table10
Gross Underwriting Spreads for Common Stock Issua
(Excluding Initial Public Offerings)







1983 1985 1987 1989
Avg.#oI Avg.#of Avg.#f Avg.#f
GrossIssuesGrossIssuesGrossIssuesGrossIssues
7.61% 212 8.17% 116 7.80% 879.66% 14
5.77% 186 5.86% 94 5.98% 53 6.25% 23
4.53% 200 4.76% 91 5.01% 81 5.10% 17
3.70% 91 3.74% 37 4.01% 46 4.36% Ii
3.30% 402.67% 42 2.93% 31 2.00% 2
Avg. # of Avg. # of Avg. #01 Avg.I of
GrossIssuesGrossIssuesGiossIssuesGrossIssues Bank?
$0-la MM 6.94% 5 6.77% 136.98% 11 7.47% 1
$10-20 MM 5.32% 35.19% 11 5.99% 25.50% 1
$20-SO MM 3.59% 34.58% 11 - -6.00% 1
$50-tOO MM 3.35% 2 3.14% 33.61% 5 - -
$100- MM 3.01% 1 - -2.96% 4 - -
• Excludes issues that do not havegross spread informationavailable.
Data Source: Securities Data Corporations New Issues Service.— 41 —
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